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Anti-Vibrator Legislation:
The Law is on Shaky Ground
by NICOLE SCHILDER*
"I think this is an uncommonly silly law."'
I. Introduction
Are women getting the shaft when it comes to the constitutional
right of privacy? According to a handful of state legislatures and the
Eleventh Circuit, states can criminalize the sale of sexual devices,2
based primarily on the idea that the privacy right does not extend to
that arena. Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia
currently have such statutes) Similar statutes were struck down by
the Colorado Supreme Court in 1985,4 the Kansas Supreme Court in
* J.D. candidate, May 2002, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
My heartfelt thanks go to Eric Anderson, Cynthia Aukerman, Jamie Nye, and Stephen
Tollafield for their penetrating insights and instrumental research assistance. Thanks also
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Margaret Russell for her assistance in bringing this Note to its final fruition.
1. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2. For the purposes of this article, "sexual devices" refers to items intended to
stimulate human genital organs, including but not limited to vibrators, dildos, artificial
vaginas, and anal beads.
3. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80(a) (2000);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (2000); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23 (Vernon 2000);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-372 (Michie 2000). Such statutes will occasionally be referred to as
"anti-sexual device" statutes in this article. There are no cases discussing constitutional
challenges to the Virginia and Mississippi anti-sexual device statutes. The Virginia statute
makes it illegal to "sell ... any obscene item." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374(3). "Obscene"
is defined as something that, "considered as a whole, has as its dominant theme or purpose
an appeal to the prurient interest in sex." Id. at § 18.2-372. It is possible that, given the
definition of obscenity, Virginia courts would not have a problem with individuals buying
sexual devices for therapeutic use. Mississippi's obscenity statute makes it a crime to
"knowingly sell[].. .any three-dimensional device designed or marketed as useful primarily
for the stimulation of human genital organs." MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105.
4. People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 370 (Colo.
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1990,' and by a Louisiana court of appeals in 1999.6 The existing
statutes prohibit the sale of what the legislatures have chosen to term
"obscene devices," which are almost uniformly described as
instruments designed or marketed as useful primarily for the
stimulation of human genital organs. This Note addresses whether
such statutes should be struck down as unconstitutional.
This Note begins with a history of sexual devices in the United
States. Some people feel that the subject of sexual devices is
offensive, crude, or titillating. Depending on a person's perspective,
it can be any of these things, or none of them. Regardless of what an
individual thinks of sexual devices generally, the legal question at
issue in this Note is important. It may be helpful for the reader to
understand the history and use of such items, particularly in the
United States, before launching into a legal analysis of anti-sexual
device statutes. The history of sexual devices is used to demonstrate
that these aids, in particular dildo-type vibrators, have been used for a
variety of reasons and approved of for centuries.
The primary argument is that anti-sexual device statutes are
unconstitutional because they infringe on the privacy right.7 The
question addressed under this argument is whether the decision to
buy and use sexual devices falls within the penumbra of protections
granted by the privacy right as articulated by the Supreme Court. As
discussed later in this Note, decisions about intimate relationships
have been acknowledged for decades as falling under the privacy
right, and they can be destroyed by sexual dysfunction. States are
invading an area in which individuals should be able to make their
own decisions, particularly about matters that fundamentally affect
their lives, by making treatment more difficult to obtain. This section
includes a discussion of a possible expansion of the privacy right and
why application of the strict scrutiny test is appropriate. The
discussion concludes that anti-sexual device statutes should be struck
down using the strict scrutiny test. However, even if they are not, the
next section concludes that such statutes should fail under the rational
1985).
5. State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1032 (Kan. 1990).
6. State v. Brenan, 739 So. 2d 368 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
7. I have chosen not to analyze these statutes under the Miller obscenity test because
I feel that the privacy issue is of greater import. Also, as one scholar noted, sexual devices
should not be considered obscene at all under the Miller test. See Maggie Ilene Kaminer,
How Broad is the Fundamental Right to Privacy and Personal Autonomy? - On What
Grounds Should the Ban on the Sale of Sexually Stimulating Devices be Considered




The second argument is that anti-sexual device statutes fail to
pass the rational basis test due to overbreadth. The problem with
such statutes is that, although they do not ban the use of sexual
devices outright, they are very broad in their proscriptions, and make
sexual devices quite difficult to obtain. State legislatures claim that
anti-sexual device statutes protect children and nonconsenting adults
from exposure to obscene matter. Yet the statutes go far beyond
what is needed to prevent that type of exposure. States could achieve
such protective goals by regulating how sexual devices are displayed
or requiring licensing of vendors, as opposed to banning sales
entirely.
This Note uses as a sample case the most recent challenge to
anti-sexual device statutes, Williams v. Pryor,8 an Eleventh Circuit
case from Alabama. It also discusses cases from several states with
anti-sexual device statutes, including their similarities to Williams and
the factors that distinguish them from Williams.. These cases,
analyzed within their relevant sections, illustrate the concept that
anti-sexual device statutes should be struck down under both strict
scrutiny and rational basis theories.
II. History and Use of Sexual Devices in the United States
A. History
Sexual devices have been used and accepted for centuries.
Therapeutic uses in particular have been widely accepted. As early as
1653 physicians were using genital massage as a treatment for women
with "hysteria."9 The massage techniques illustrated at that time have
changed little over the centuries.'" The development of electricity
simply made it easier for those practicing genital massage, as electric
devices allow for continuous stimulation without fatigue and they
require less skill on the part of the person performing the massage."At the end of the nineteenth century, the forerunner of today's
8. 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001).
9. RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF ORGASM: "HYSTERIA," THE
VIBRATOR, AND WOMEN'S SEXUAL SATISFACTION 1 (1999). "Hysteria," which literally
means womb disease, consisted of a wide variety of symptoms in women, including
"fainting,... nervousness, insomnia,... muscle spasms,... [and] loss of appetite for food
or for sex." Id. at 1, 23.
10. Id. at 12.
11. Id. at 11.
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vibrator12 was invented by a doctor in England as a "palliative for
female complaints."' 3 Physicians of that era were pleased with the
dramatic decrease in treatment time for hysteria patients (from one
hour pre-vibrator to ten minutes post-vibrator) because they could
service more patients.' 4 It was a convenient way to improve clinical
productivity and increase the amount of money doctors could bring in
by treating more patients.'5 At that time, and indeed until 1952 when
the American Psychiatric Association changed the medical paradigm,
hysteria was "one of the most frequently diagnosed diseases in
history."' 6  Doctors had many patients requiring treatment for
hysteria. Furthermore, doctors did not want to be the ones
performing genital massage on women, not because it was immoral,
but because they thought it was "a routine chore," and were thus
grateful to have instruments available to perform the task.'8
Vibrating genital massagers were popular until the 1920s, 9 after
which they fell out of favor among many in the United States.
However, vibrators have continued to be offered for sale, mostly
without proscription or other regulation, and they have been used for
sexual therapy on a regular basis. In addition, women and men buy
sexual devices for everyday intimate activities and personal pleasure.
B. Therapeutic Uses
Notably, the Food and Drug Administration established
regulations regarding both "powered vaginal muscle stimulators 2 °
and "genital vibrators"'" in their therapeutic forms in 1980.22 Vaginal
muscle stimulators are devices that are intended for "therapeutic use
in increasing muscular tone and strength in the treatment of sexual
12. For the purposes of this article, a vibrator is a device used to stimulate human
genital organs, which may or may not be shaped like a phallus, and which runs on battery
or electrical power.
13. MAINES, supra note 9, at 11.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 4.
19. MAINES, supra note 9, at 20. In fact, vibrating massagers were advertised in many
magazines and catalogs, including Sears, Roebuck, through the 1920s and beyond. Id. at
105.
20. 21 C.F.R. § 884.5940 (2001).
21. Id. § 884.5960.
22. Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1284 n.33 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
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dysfunction."23 Similarly, genital vibrators are "electrically operated
device[s] ... for therapeutic use in the treatment of sexual
dysfunction or as an adjunct to Kegel's exercise (tightening of the
muscles of the pelvic floor to increase muscle tone)."24
Many therapists today like their patients to use vibrators because
women with "very high orgasmic thresholds," who would otherwise
not be able to have orgasms at all, usually respond to vibrators at
some point.25 These women are often diagnosed as "anorgasmic."26
Anorgasmy, the inability to have an orgasm, is a "recognized and
treatable medical condition."27 If not treated, it can have deleterious
effects on women's health, both physically and psychologically.28
Perhaps the most important argument this Note addresses is the fact
that anorgasmy can "destroy a marriage or relationship., 29  The
standard treatment for this medical condition is the use of vibrators
and other such sexual devices.3"
As stipulated by the parties in Williams v. Pryor, vibrators can
help anorgasmic women in several ways.3 For those who are not as
responsive physiologically, vibrators help lower the threshold at
which orgasm is produced. Second, when used in conjunction with
Kegel's exercise,33 they help tighten relaxed pelvic muscles, which can
help women who are incontinent, and can also return orgasmic
responses to a woman's normal level.3" Finally, in women who have
orgasmic inhibition,3" vibrators can help lower inhibitions so that
more intense stimulation is presented."
23. 21 C.F.R. § 884.5940.
24. Id. at § 884.5960.
25. MAINES, supra note 9, at 122. The end users of sexual devices who brought suit
against Alabama included women who use vibrators and other sexual devices as
therapeutic implements. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1267.
26. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
27. Id. at 1265-66.
28. Id. at 1266.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1265.
31. Id. at 1265-66.
32. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.
33. A vaginal muscle exercise that is "universally acknowledged as the most effective
way of avoiding urinary stress incontinence, short of surgery." Id.
34. Id.
35. This condition is caused by having a history of sexual experiences that are
nonorgasmic. Id.
36. Id.
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This brings us to the most recent case, Williams v. Pryor,37 in
which the Eleventh Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of anti-
sexual device statutes.
C. Williams v. Pryor
In 1998, the Alabama state legislature amended its obscenity
statute to include a ban on the sale or production of "any device
designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of
human genital organs."38 Anyone found guilty of violating the statute
can be charged with a misdemeanor, fined up to $10,000, and
imprisoned for up to one year.39 Further convictions may result in the
accused being charged with a felony. The legislature stated as its
primary reason for the statute that it would protect children and
unconsenting adults from being exposed to "'open displays' of
'obscene material.""'4  When it enacted this statute, the Alabama
legislature made it far more difficult for its citizens to obtain sexual
devices, regardless of the manner in which they are to be used.4'
Shortly after the statute went into effect, several women,
representing both vendors and end users of sexual devices, brought
suit against the state in federal court, seeking a permanent injunction
against enforcement of the statute, claiming the amendment was
unconstitutional." The plaintiffs claimed that if the attorney general
enforced the statute, it would "impose an undue burden on their
'fundamental rights of privacy and personal autonomy guaranteed
by ... the constitution;"'4 3 thus, they argued that "their right of
privacy and personal autonomy constitute[d] a 'liberty interest'
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'  The plaintiffs wanted the court to recognize an
expansion of the right to privacy in order to include the use of sexual
devices when engaged in private and lawful sexual activity. 5 The
37. 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001).
38. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1).
39. Id.
40. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1288.
41. As will be discussed later in this Note, some sex therapy experts believe that if
statutes such as these are allowed to stand, "anorgasmic women [will] be 'substantially
impacted,"' as the unavailability of dildo-type vibrators "'would put a very serious block in
the way of effective treatment."' Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1025.
42. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1257.
43. Id. at 1274.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1275.
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district court framed the question as whether the right to use sexual
devices was fundamental under the constitutional right to privacy.'
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the proper way to strike
down the legislation would be to expand the right to privacy by
including a person's freedom to use sexual devices." Unfortunately, it
did not find that to be a suitable option. Instead, the lower court
decided that it would not be appropriate to recognize an extension of
the constitutional privacy right to include the right to use sexual
devices,48 and made a strong argument against such expansion."
However, the district court granted the permanent injunction on
enforcement of the statute.50 The court based its decision on a
rational basis analysis, holding that the statute was "an exaggerated
response to the State's concerns, and an overly broad means of
regulating or prohibiting commerce of obscenity,"51 and therefore
bore no "reasonable, rational relation to a legitimate state interest.,
52
On appeal, however, a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district court's decision and remanded for further
proceedings. 3 The panel based the reversal on the appellate court's
conclusion that the statute was facially constitutional because the
state had a legitimate interest in protecting public morality and that
this interest was rationally served by the statute.' On the other hand,
the appellate court stated that the lower court had not spent enough
time analyzing whether the right at issue was fundamental. It decided
that the district court had merely considered "whether the 'use of
sexual devices' is a deeply rooted and central liberty. 5 5 On remand,
the panel directed the district court to consider the challenges
brought by end users of sexual devices; specifically, to determine
"whether our nation has a deeply rooted history of state interference,
or state non-interference, in the private sexual activity of married or
unmarried [heterosexual] persons [and] whether contemporary
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1293.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Williams, 240 F.3d at 956.
54. Id. at 949.
55. Id. at 955.
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practice bolsters or undermines any such history."56
III. Expansion of the Fundamental Privacy Right
This section attempts to answer the question whether the use of
sexual devices falls under the penumbra of protections granted by the
privacy right. If a court finds that there is a fundamental right to use
sexual devices in the privacy of one's home, then it must apply the
strict scrutiny standard to determine whether the statute is
constitutional. 7 In order to be upheld as constitutional under strict
scrutiny, a statute must be "tailored to serve a compelling state
interest."58  It must also be "the most narrowly drawn means of
achieving that end."59  Statutes analyzed under strict scrutiny are
almost always found to be constitutionally infirm.' In fact, some
scholars believe that the United States Supreme Court declares
certain rights to be fundamental in order to use the strict scrutiny test
to strike down statutes, particularly in cases where the Justices
suspect legislation is an attempt to enforce a certain type of morality.6"
The first time the Supreme Court declared that the right to
privacy in marital relationships had constitutional protection was in
Griswold v. Connecticut, a case involving state regulation of the use of
contraceptives by married couples.62 At that time, Connecticut law
made it a crime to use contraceptives or to aid and abet anyone in
using contraceptives, regardless of marital status.63 The Court chose
to hear the case because it directly involved "an intimate relation of
husband and wife.... "6 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
"drew on existing case law to help establish support for the idea of
constitutional protection for a privacy right not enumerated in the
Constitution.'' His discussion of earlier cases included the idea of
"penumbras" surrounding guarantees in the Bill of Rights, "formed
56. Id. at 955-56. The court was referring to application of the Glucksberg test
discussed infra Section III.A.1.
57. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
58. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
59. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,189 (1986).
60. D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State Enforcement of
Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 98 (1993).
61. Id.
62. 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 482.
65. PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY AND THE POLITICS OF INTIMATE LIFE 86 (1996).
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by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."66 The concept of penumbras became a way for the Court
to provide constitutional protection for rights that were not
enumerated by the Framers.
Only eight years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court
shifted from Griswold's rationale of protecting the marital
relationship, and expanded the privacy right to all individuals for
decisions that involved their bodies.6 Eisenstadt extended the right
granted to married people in Griswold to unmarried individuals.68
William Baird was convicted under a Massachusetts statute that made
it illegal in most situations to provide individuals with
contraceptives.69 Using the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held
that the statute did not survive even the minimal rational basis test.70
The Court stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters... fundamentally
affecting a person .... ,,71 Though this. particular holding dealt with
the choice of whether to conceive a child, rather than sexual privacy
generally, the shift seemed to signal an expansion of the penumbra of
privacy rights, and it particularly included unmarried individuals
under its protection.
Eisenstadt and two of its sister cases, Carey v. Population Services
International,72 and Roe v. Wade,73 protect privacy because the Court
recognized "respect for decisions that fundamentally affect a person's
life., 74  The decision whether to use sexual devices can also
fundamentally affect an individual's life by potentially saving intimate
relationships that might otherwise be destroyed by sexual
dysfunction.
Two decades after Griswold, the Court was presented with
another privacy issue. In Bowers v. Hardwick, Michael Hardwick, a
66. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. Justice Douglas included the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments in his discussion. Id. at 484-85.
67. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
68. Id. at 453.
69. Id. at 440. Specifically, the statute banned the distribution of contraceptives
except in the following circumstances: to married individuals for pregnancy prevention,
and to married or unmarried individuals for disease prevention. Id. at 441.
70. Id. at 447 n.7.
71. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
72. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74. BOLING, supra note 65, at 87.
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homosexual man, was charged with committing sodomy in his home.75
Hardwick brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Georgia's
criminal sodomy statute .76 The Eleventh Circuit held that the statute
was a violation of the privacy right, and remanded it for review under
the strict scrutiny test.77 In the meantime, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the circuits and
reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision.7 ' The Court, focusing its
attention on the "ancient roots" of the proscription, held that
homosexuals had no fundamental right to engage in sodomy.79
Justice Blackmun wrote a powerful dissent, in which he stated his
belief that "the right of an individual to conduct intimate
relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home seems to me to
be the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy."'8 Justice
Blackmun also noted that "[o]nly the most willful blindness could
obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is 'a sensitive, key relationship of
human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the
development of human personality,"' and that "there [are] many
'right' ways of conducting those relationships."'"
The strict scrutiny test was applied in most of the
aforementioned cases. That test consists of three basic questions: (1)
Is there a fundamental right?; (2) Is the fundamental right being
infringed?; and (3) Does the government have a compelling interest
in regulating the activity, by means that are narrowly tailored to meet
that interest (ends/means test)? The Supreme Court used this test in
Griswold when it struck down a statute criminalizing the use of
contraceptives.12 As noted in the Glucksberg analysis below, the right
to buy and sell sexual devices should fall under the fundamental
privacy right, thus making statutes banning such sales an infringement
upon that fundamental right. Finally, because states could use less
restrictive measures to meet their goal of keeping minors and
unconsenting adults from being exposed to displays of sexual devices,
anti-sexual device statutes fail the ends/means test, making them
75. 478 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1986).
76. Id. at 188.
77. Id. at 189.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 192. Williams is distinguishable from Bowers, since, as will be noted later,
there is no longstanding tradition of criminalizing the sale of sexual devices.
80. Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).




A. Is the Right to Buy and Sell Sexual Devices Fundamental and Is
That Right Infringed By Anti-Sexual Device Statutes?
The Due Process Clause is a guarantee of more than just fair
process. It also "provides heightened protection against government
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests."83
For a right to be fundamental, it must be "'objectively, deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. ' 84  While the Court is reluctant to expand
substantive due process rights,85 the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the government [from]
infring[ing]... 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what
process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest."'' Courts use strict scrutiny, the
least deferential standard of review, to analyze statutes that may
violate a fundamental right.7
In general, when dealing with substantive due process issues,
courts look to the morality of the community as a guide, rather than
acting as a check on morality the way they do in Equal Protection
cases." Courts look to many sources when determining due process
content, including "the traditions and conscience of our people,"89
"this Nation's history and tradition," 90 and "the rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free persons."91 It would seem that,
with the community's morality being the key factor in substantive due
process issues, legislatures would be better positioned to interpret
83. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). "Liberty interests" are not
limited to "exemption from physical restraint." Statutes enacted by legislatures can be
struck down by the courts when they are "oppressive and arbitrary." Welch, supra note
60, at 98.
84. Williams, 240 F.3d at 955 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21).
85. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
86. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). The courts tend to
get around the fact that an unenumerated right is involved by labeling the liberty interest
invoked a fundamental right, thereby allowing them to strike down the legislation by
reviewing it under strict scrutiny. Welch, supra note 60, at 98.
87. Welch, supra note 60, at 73. Strict scrutiny is also used in cases "when legislative
action impinges upon suspect classes," such as race, alienage, and national origin. Id.
88. Id. at 96.
89. Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
90. Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
91. Welch, supra note 60, at 96.
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that morality as legislation.92 According to some scholars, however,
there are many judges and Justices who "believe that the Due Process
Clause does impose an obligation on the Court to decide whether the
legislature got it right on community morality."93  The Court, by
adding unenumerated rights, has chosen in many cases basically to
say that the enforcement of the morality of the community is not a
legitimate end because it "does not provide a sufficient, legitimate
reason for restricting liberty."9 That should be the holding of cases
dealing with anti-sexual device statutes.
The most relevant test 95 to determine whether there is a
fundamental right to privacy that covers the buying and selling of
sexual devices is articulated by the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Glucksberg.96
1. Glucksberg Analysis
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Williams strongly implies that
on remand the district court should perform a Glucksberg analysis to
determine whether the right claimed by the plaintiffs is indeed
fundamental. The statute at issue in Glucksberg made it illegal to
assist or cause a suicide.9  Plaintiffs, who filed for declaratory
judgment that the statute violated the Due Process Clause, included
terminally ill patients and physicians who stated that if it were not for
the statute, they would assist some of their terminally patients in
committing suicide.9 The Court began by looking at United States
92. Id. at 97.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 99.
95. Some might argue that a more appropriate test would be the undue burden
analysis used in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S 914 (2000). Under the undue burden test, a court would look to see
whether the obscenity statutes had the "purpose or effect [of placing] a substantial
obstacle[] in the path of a" person seeking to buy a sexual device. Casey, 505 U.S. at 837.
However, the undue burden test should not apply in cases related to sexual devices. Casey
and Stenberg dealt with abortion issues, which affect more people than just the individual
making the decision to end her pregnancy. Buying and selling sexual devices, however,
does not have the same type of ramifications, particularly not the ending of a life-in-
progress, as some people believe abortion does. There is no real comparison to be made
here.
96. 521 U.S. 702, 722-23 (1997).
97. Williams, 240 F.3d at 955-56.
98. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06.
99. Id. at 707-08.
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history and legal traditions and practices."°° It pointed out that
assisted suicide had been against the common morality since the
founding of the United States, as well as having been a crime at
common law before that. 1' The Court then looked at the plaintiffs'
due process claims. In doing so, it followed a two-step analysis,
looking first at whether there was a liberty interest at stake,' then at
whether such a liberty interest was part of the United States'
tradition."0
The first step in the due process analysis involves determining
whether there was a liberty interest at stake.' In Glucksberg, the
Court followed its tradition of "carefully formulating the interest at
stake in substantive-due-process cases."'' 1 It crafted the question as
"whether the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause
include[d] a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to
assistance in doing so.""
In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit seemed to believe that in order
to determine whether there was a liberty interest, they needed to
establish whether "our nation ha[d] a deeply rooted history of state
interference, or state non-interference, in the private sexual activity of
married or unmarried persons."'"0 In this Note's analysis, however,
the question is whether the decision to buy and use sexual devices is
one that can fundamentally affect an individual's life.
The second step of the Glucksberg analysis was to determine
whether the "asserted right ha[d] any place in our Nation's
traditions."'" 9 This can also be phrased as "whether contemporary
practice bolsters or undermines" the historical aspects of the right."'
The Court noted that in order to strike down Washington's statute
banning assisted suicide, it would have to "reverse centuries of legal
doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of
100. Id. at 710.
101. Id. at 711-16.
102. Id. at 719.
103. Id. at 722.
104. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
105. Id. at 722.
106. Id. at 722.
107. Id. at 723.
108. Williams, 240 F.3d at 956.
109. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
110. Williams, 240 F.3d at 955.
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almost every State.'" After distinguishing two other Supreme Court
cases,'1 2 the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the assisted-suicide
statute."3 As discussed previously in this Note, a similarly historical
approach was taken by the Supreme Court in Bowers.'
a. Applying Glucksberg to the Sale and Purchase of Sexual Devices
A look at the history of statutes banning the sale of sexual
devices does not show the same type of continuous proscription that
the Court saw in Glucksberg and Bowers. Only a handful of states
have obscenity statutes that include bans on the sales of sexual
devices,"5 and three other states struck down their statutes as being
unconstitutional."6  Furthermore, most of these anti-sexual device
statutes have not been in place for very long, as opposed to the
"centuries" of history relied on by the Court in Glucksberg"7 and the
"ancient roots" relied on in Bowers."8  Clearly the compelling
historical argument in Glucksberg played a large part in the Court's
decision. Conversely, the lack of a historical argument regarding the
sale of sexual devices should work in favor of declaring anti-sexual
device statutes unconstitutional under a Glucksberg analysis.
Furthermore, the use of sexual devices in therapy can save marriages
and other intimate relationships and thus can have an enormous and
fundamental impact on an individual's life.
Therefore, considering a Glucksberg analysis, along with both
the Colorado and Kansas cases discussed below, the decision to buy
and use sexual devices is one that fundamentally affects an
individual's life and thus falls under the constitutional privacy right.
B. Ends/Means Test
As noted by the court in Williams, states traditionally have had a
compelling interest in protecting the morals of their citizens."9 This
111. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
112. Id. at 724-28.
113. Id. at 728.
114. See supra note 79.
115. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80(a); Miss. CODE ANN. §
97-29-105; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-372.
116. People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 370 (Colo.
1985); State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1990); State v. Brenan, 739 So. 2d 368 (La. Ct.
App. 1999).
117. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
118. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
119. Williams, 240 F.3d at 949.
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interest includes protecting children and unconsenting adults from
being exposed to sexually explicit materials. However, banning the
sale of sexual devices outright is certainly not the most narrowly
tailored method of reaching the desired goal. As discussed in Section
IV.A.3. infra, there are ways that legislatures can regulate the sale of
sexual devices that are more narrowly tailored to serve the
compelling state interest, such as requiring visual barriers or
forbidding minors to enter stores selling sexual devices. Therefore,
current anti-sexual device statutes fail the ends/means test of strict
scrutiny and should be struck down.
C. State Court Decisions Based on Strict Scrutiny
Colorado, Kansas, and Texas had statutes that criminalized the
sale of sexual devices. These statutes were overturned by the
supreme courts of Colorado and Kansas on the basis that their
citizens' fundamental privacy rights were being impinged (i.e. using
the strict scrutiny test). The Texas Supreme Court upheld the Texas
statute, but the case can be distinguished from others, particularly
Williams, and should not be followed. Cases challenging anti-sexual
device statutes, including Williams on remand or if it is appealed to
the Supreme Court, should reach similar decisions to those of the
Colorado and Kansas supreme courts.
1. Colorado
Colorado had an obscenity statute that made it a crime to
"promote[] ... any obscene device.""12  "Obscene devices" were
defined as "device[s] including a dildo or artificial vagina, designed or
marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital
organs." ' The portion of the obscenity statute relating to obscene
devices was severed and struck down in 1985.122
In People v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., three cases
challenging Colorado's obscenity statute were consolidated due to the
similarity of their claims. 23 In the first case, People v. Seven Thirty-
Five East Colfax, Inc., the prosecution in a civil suit wanted to have
certain items labeled obscene. 24 The trial court found an unrelated
section of the statute unconstitutional, but denied dismissal of the
120. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-102(2)(a)(I) (1984).
121. Id. at § 18-7-101(3).
122. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, 697 P.2d at 370, 372.
123. Id. at 353.
124. Id.
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complaint."' In the second case, People v. Mizell, defendants had
been charged with selling obscene devices in violation of the statute.2 1
The trial court held the entire statute invalid, but stayed judgment
pending appeal.2 7  Finally, in Adult Literary Guild v. Beacom,
plaintiffs wanted an injunction against enforcement of the statute.
The trial court held that the statute was unconstitutional and granted
the injunction.2 On the consolidated appeal, the Colorado Supreme
Court struck down the part of the statute referring to obscene
devices.2 9
The supreme court believed that Colorado's obscenity statute
impermissibly burdened the privacy right, stemming from the liberty
interest based in the Due Process Clause.30 It referred to the privacy
rights of those who want to use sexual devices as part of "legitimate
medical or therapeutic" treatment."' It further noted the state's lack
of a compelling interest justifying such a broad and sweeping
proscription of sexual devices.32 The supreme court also explicitly
declined to answer the question of whether the sale and use of sexual
devices could be regulated by the state.'33
2. Kansas
A Kansas obscenity statute dealing with the sale of obscene
devices was struck down by the Kansas Supreme Court in 1990.'
The Kansas statute made it illegal to "sell[] ... any ... obscene
device."'3 5 "Obscene device" was defined as "a device, including a
dildo or artificial vagina, designed or marketed as useful primarily for
the stimulation of human genital organs.' 1 3
6
The state charged Randy Hughes with selling two obscene
devices37 to undercover police officers.'38 During his evidentiary
125. Id. at 354.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, 697 P.2d at 354.




133. Id. at 370, n.28.
134. Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1032.
135. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301(a)(1) (1989).
136. Id. at § 21-4301(c)(3).
137. These devices were "The Sexplorer Pleasure System," consisting of a vibrator
with dildo attachment, and "Miss World," an "inflatable doll with an artificial vagina."
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hearing, a doctor testified, as in Williams, to the effectiveness of
dildo-type vibrators in treating anorgasmic women.'39 He provided
the same three reasons for effectiveness that were given by the
experts in Williams.' The trial court's rationale was that the statute
was overbroad because it invaded the privacy right, and thus the right
to perform or receive legitimate medical treatment, because
physicians and therapists could be subject to criminal sanctions. 4'
The Kansas Supreme Court chose to follow the Colorado
Supreme Court's decision in Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax.142 It
declared not only that "the dissemination and promotion of such
devices for purposes of medical and psychological therapy" were
constitutionally protected activities, but that the statute was
overbroad because it violated the privacy right as it related to such
therapy.143 The court concluded that the state legislature had not
demonstrated an interest compelling enough to justify infringing such
rights. The amended Kansas statute now specifically excludes devices
that were "disseminated or promoted for the purpose of medical or
psychological therapy.'144
3. Texas
In a more recent Texas case, a trial court convicted Noe
Regalado of possessing obscene devices with the intent to sell, and his
sentence was affirmed by the Texas Court of Appeals.45 Undercover
police officers discovered devices that they believed were obscene
146
at the shop where Regalado was working. 47 The officers seized the
devices and arrested Regalado.148  The appellate court upheld the
Texas statute, declaring that it was following Yorko v. State,'49 and did
Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1025.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1026; Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1257, 1274-75.
141. Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1026.
142. 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985).
143. Id. at 1032.
144. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301(c)(3).
145. Regalado v. State, 872 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Tex. 1994).
146. Namely, an item called the Flexi-lover. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The Texas statute includes a presumption that when there are "six or more
obscene devices" in a person's possession, that person has an intent to sell them. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23(f).
149. 690 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1975). See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
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not believe there was a privacy right that "protects use of or
possession with intent to promote obscene devices.""15 Regalado thus
has a major characteristic distinguishing it from Williams: the
defendant in Regalado was not allowed to bring up the health benefits
of sexual devices because of his position as a retailer, as opposed to
purchaser."'
Furthermore, the court in Regalado considered whether "the
right to privacy protects the use of or possession with intent to
promote obscene devices," not whether there is a more general
fundamental privacy right involved. It went on to note the Supreme
Court's opinion in Carey,'53 which pointed out that the Court had
"never held that a fundamental right to sexual privacy exist[ed] under
the constitution."'54 What the Regalado court failed to mention was
the footnote in Carey which stated that the Court had never
"definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what
extent" our constitution prohibits statutes that regulate "private
consensual sexual behavior" among adults.' Carey discussed
whether the sexual mores of minors could be regulated, not whether
the right to privacy should be expanded or contracted.156 Therefore,
the holding in Regalado should not apply to anti-sexual device cases
in general.
IV. Rational Basis
Even if courts decide that anti-sexual device statutes are not
protected by the privacy right, and thus do not meet the criteria for
the strict scrutiny test, such statutes should be struck down under the
rational basis test. When there is no interference with a fundamental
right, courts use this very deferential test to determine the
constitutionality of statutes."7 The test is so highly deferential to the
legislature that it has been described as "minimum scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact."'58 Indeed, almost all statutes analyzed
150. Regalado, 872 S.W.2d at 9.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 4.
153. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
154. Id.
155. Carey, 431 U.S. at 695 n.17.
156. Id.
157. Welch, supra note 60, at 73.
158. Id.
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under the rational basis test are upheld by the courts."' All that is
required for a statute to meet the rational basis test is that it be
"rationally related to a legitimate state interest."' 60
However, some courts are still willing to use the rational basis
test to strike down statutes being challenged under the Due Process
Clause.' One way of doing so is to find that a state has a legitimate
interest in regulating a behavior or activity, but that the statute
regulating that interest is overbroad.62 This should be the outcome in
cases involving anti-sexual device statutes.
A. State Anti-Sexual Device Cases Decided Under the Rational Basis
Test
When courts do not find a fundamental privacy right under Due
Process analysis like the courts in Colorado, Kansas, and Texas, they
use the rational basis test to determine whether there was a legitimate
state interest that was rationally served by the statute. Several state
cases deal with this issue. Georgia, Texas, and Louisiana had statutes
criminalizing the sale of sexual devices. Courts in Georgia and Texas
upheld their statutes, but the cases involved are readily
distinguishable from cases such as Williams. Louisiana, in a case
distinctly parallel to Williams, struck down its anti-sexual device
statute under the rational basis test, finding that the state legislature
could have used other means of reaching its goals.
1. Georgia
Georgia's obscenity statute makes it illegal to "sell[] ... any
obscene material of any description.. ,,63 "Obscene material"
includes "[a]ny device designed or marketed as useful primarily for
the stimulation of human genital organs."'" In Sewell v. State, the
appellant was arrested and convicted after he sold an artificial vagina
to a police officer.' The Georgia Supreme Court dismissed in one
159. Id. at 72-73.
160. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
161. Welch, supra note 60, at 73; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
162. Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1030.
163. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80(a). It is an affirmative defense under the statute that
"dissemination of the material was restricted to: [a] person whose receipt of such material
was authorized in writing by a licensed medical practitioner or psychiatrist." Id. at § 16-
12-80(e)(2).
164. Id. at § 16-12-80(c).
165. 233 S.E.2d 187, 188 (Ga. 1977).
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paragraph an attack on the statute's constitutionality.166 It said merely
that the statute had "withstood the same attacks" in the past."' Since
the amendment in question had only more concretely defined terms
that had been in the former statute, there was no substantive
change.'
The Georgia court was referring to Dyke v. State.'69 That case
dealt with the screening of pornographic films that were declared
obscene and did not include anything about sexual devices."' The
appellant claimed that the statute was overbroad but the Georgia
Supreme Court upheld the statute by stating that the claim must fail
because Georgia's obscenity statute had been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in Paris Adult Theatre V 171
Paris Adult Theatre I was another case where pornographic films
that were screened in adult theatres were declared obscene.7 This
case can be distinguished from Williams and other constitutional
challenges to anti-sexual device statutes by the fact that the complaint
brought against the defendants was a civil claim for an injunction, not
a criminal prosecution under an obscenity statute.' Therefore, the
constitutionality of the Georgia obscenity statute was not at issue."'
Furthermore, while it specifically mentioned items such as books
and films, the Court did not mention sexual devices and the holding
does not appear to apply to sexual devices at all. The opinion only
discusses the limited question of whether there is a right "to watch
obscene movies in places of public accommodation."'75 The one link
to Williams is that the majority opinion specifically talks about the
privacy right as encompassing and protecting "the personal intimacies
of the home," including marriage."' As stated previously, the lack of
sexual intimacy that may result from sexual dysfunction can destroy




169. 209 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. 1974).
170. Id. at 168.
171. Id. at 169. Also, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to Paris
Adult Theatre I less than two weeks after arguments in Dyke. Id.
172. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 50 (1973).
173. Id. at 75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 66.
176. Id. at 65.
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therapeutic use of sexual devices.
2. Texas
As noted previously, the Texas obscenity statute makes it a
evcs177felony to sell obscene devices. An "obscene device" is defined in
Texas as "a device including a dildo or artificial vagina, designed or
marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital
organs., 178 One appellate court upheld the Texas statute under the
rational basis test.
7 9
In 1985, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the
obscenity statute in Yorko v. State."° Kenneth Yorko pled not guilty
to possession with intent to sell a dildo.' Yorko claimed on appeal
that the statute violated the privacy right and was thus
unconstitutional."' He did not bring up, and the court did not discuss,
arguments based on overbreadth or the health benefits of sexual
devices.'83 The court believed that the very narrow question to be
answered was whether "the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee[s] a citizen the right to stimulate his, her or
another's genitals with an object designed or marketed as useful
primarily for that purpose."" In other words, the court basically
looked at whether there was a fundamental right to use sexual devices
to stimulate human genitals,'85 the same basic question that the district
court in Williams used, which the Eleventh Circuit believed was
erroneous. Using this approach, the court held that the state was
justified in making the sale of sexual devices a crime."'The dissent in Yorko also took notice of the question as the
177. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23(a).
178. Id. at § 43.21(a)(7). As in Georgia, the Texas statute does allow for the
affirmative defense of promoting obscene devices when it is for "a bona fide medical [or]
psychiatric ... purpose." Id. at § 43.23(g). Interestingly, the appellant's argument in
Regalado involved a challenge based on the benefits of using sexual devices in medical or
psychological treatment, but that argument was not followed in the holding. Perhaps the
state legislature chose to include this subsection in order to keep the entire statute from
eventually being struck down under the health and privacy rationale.
179. Regalado v. State, 872 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. 1994); Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.
1985).
180. Yorko, 690 S.W.2d at 265-66.
181. Id. at 261.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 261, 265.
184. Id. at 263.
185. Id. at 263.
186. Yorko, 690 S.W.2d at 266.
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majority framed it, stating that the question could more properly have
been framed as "[w]hether the constitutional right of personal privacy
is broad enough to encompass a person's decision to engage in private
consensual sexual activity that includes stimulating human genital
organs with an object designed to be primarily useful for that
purpose." '87 Judge Clinton went on to say that if the answer to that
question was yes, then the line of contraception cases comes into
play." He quoted the United States Supreme Court, saying that "in
practice, a prohibition against all sales, since more easily and less
offensively enforced, might have an even more devastating
effect... ,189 The same can be said for statutes that make the sale of
sexual devices illegal. They too, are more easily enforced, and
certainly have a deleterious impact on those who are trying to
purchase the items.
Judge Clinton further noted in his dissent that the privacy right
means that people are "free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters" fundamentally affecting them, such as the
decision whether to bear a child."9 From that, it flows that the
"decision whether to engage in private consensual sexual activity in
the first instances must be practically invulnerable."' 9' Particularly for
people who require the use of sexual devices to engage in fulfilling
sexual activity, statutes banning the sale of such items impinge on
their fundamental right to privacy. A separate dissent also discussed
the link to the contraceptive cases, stating that if a state may not deny
access to contraceptives, it should not be able to deny access to sexual
devices that have therapeutic value.'92 That dissent went on to discuss
the testimony of an expert in sexual behavior who believed that
sexual devices, whether prescribed by a therapist or self-prescribed,
are effective treatment, and the ability to purchase them should not
be limited. 93
Besides the issues raised by the dissents in Yorko, the case can be
distinguished from Williams in two very important ways. First, Yorko
did not base his challenge on an overbreadth argument, so that
187. Id. at 267 (Clinton, J., dissenting)(emphasis excluded).
188. Id. (Clinton, J., dissenting). ,
189. Id. at 267 n.4 (Clinton, J., dissenting) (citing Carey, 431 U.S. 684).
190. Id. at 268 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 268 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
192. Yorko, 690 S.W.2d at 272 (Teague, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 273 (Teague, J., dissenting).
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challenge was not considered by the court.194 Second, the court did
not consider the health benefits of sexual devices, except in a single
brief sentence in a dissent.9 Yorko merely brought up the idea that
sexual devices were "designed, purchased and used consensually only
for the purpose of sexual stimulation and gratification. ' 96 Therefore,
the court's rationale in Yorko cannot be extended to all cases
regarding the sale of sexual devices, particularly those where the
devices are intended for use in sexual therapy.
3. Louisiana
The most compelling case, and the one most similar to Williams,
is State v. Brenan, from the Louisiana courts.19' Louisiana's statute
criminalizing sexual devices stated that "[n]o person shall knowingly
and intentionally promote an obscene device., 198 "Obscene device"
was defined to include "an artificial penis or artificial vagina"...
[intended for] the stimulation of human genital organs.""9 In 1999,
this statute was declared overbroad and thus unconstitutional by the
Louisiana Court of Appeal.'l
The state charged Christine Brenan with promoting obscene
devices under the Louisiana statute and the trial court convicted her
on both counts. 1 Brenan had sold the devices at her place of
business, and undercover officers had purchased several devices that
they deemed obscene. On appeal, she claimed that the trial court
erred in denying her motion to have the statute declared
unconstitutional. After noting the conflicting results of the cases
from Georgia, Texas, Alabama, and Kansas, the trial court agreed
with the rationale of the district court in Williams, holding that the
statute lacked a "rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. ' 20
2
As the district court did in Williams, the appellate court performed its
analysis with the idea that the primary purpose of the statute was to
protect children and unconsenting adults. 3
194. Id. at 262.
195. Id. at 272 (Teague, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 265.
197. 739 So. 2d 368 (La. 1999).
198. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1(B) (West 1999).
199. Id. at § 14:106.1(A)(1).
200. Brenan, 739 So. 2d at 372.
201. Id. at 369.
202. Id. at 371.
203. Id. at 372.
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The appellate court held that "the regulation of the sale of
obscene devices [wa]s clearly within the scope of the State's police
power."2"4 Another important factor was the legislature's purpose
that children should and could be protected from public displays of
obscene devices.20 ' The court held that the state did have a legitimate
interest in protecting children.2'8  However, the statute could have
been much more narrowly drawn, and thus was overbroad in its
application of the police power.27  As the court noted, only
consenting adults will actually purchase such devices, and
unconsenting adults would merely be upset or offended by such
items.'
The district court in Williams also held that the state had a
legitimate interest in protecting children and unconsenting adults, and
still found no rational relation between Alabama's statute and the
legislature's purposes. 29 This is the type of outcome that we should
see in cases involving anti-sexual device statutes. Statutes regulating
sales of sexual devices need not ban them completely to achieve the
purported legislative purpose. Stores selling sexual devices could
easily put up curtains or some other kind of visual barrier so that
children and unconsenting adults passing on the street would not be
subjected to the displays.2"0 Furthermore, storeowners could put up
signs outside their stores, informing passersby that they could
potentially be offended and that children are not permitted to enter.
Finally, adults attending the Tupperware-style parties provided by
some vendors of sexual devices21' most certainly consent to the
exposure by being present. Statutes could ban the attendance of
children at such parties, if that was a concern.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Brenan, 739 So. 2d at 372.
207. Id. The Louisiana legislature could, for instance, regulate promotion or
advertising of obscene devices, or require licensing of vendors. Id.
208. Id.
209. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
210. Some stores selling sexual devices, including Good Vibrations in San Francisco,
already use visual barriers, both to protect children walking past the store and to protect
the privacy of their customers.





Statutes banning the sale of sexual devices are, in the words of
Justice Stewart, just plain "silly. 2 12 Justice Stewart went on to say
that it was not the Court's job to determine whether it thought the
"law [wa]s unwise, or even asinine., 213 While it might not be up to the
judiciary to determine the inherent ridiculousness of laws, it is its
place to ensure that American citizens do not have their rights
trampled upon by legislators overeager to inflict their views of
appropriate sexuality upon the general populace.
The decision to use a sexual device, regardless of the reason, is
an intimate, individual decision and not one that should be impinged
upon by state legislatures and the courts. Not only does the
constitutional right of privacy include the right to buy sexual devices
for use in the privacy of one's home, but these devices are used by
many people for many purposes, and have a legitimate therapeutic
value. They do not harm those who choose not to buy or use them.
In fact, states can regulate how they are sold and advertised without
infringing the fundamental right to make the individual decision
whether to purchase and use sexual devices.
Furthermore, our society has changed over the past several
decades. Our widely held belief that people deserve happiness in
marital relationships has been supplemented by the idea that other
intimate relationships are acceptable. Sexual fulfillment is an integral
part of happiness in intimate relationships. Statutes criminalizing the
sale of sexual devices are deleterious to this concept and to the
privacy right as a whole. They must be struck down.
212. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
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